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


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Editor's Note



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Dear Readers,

Greetings!

Both war and armed conflicts have decisive deteriorating impact on concerned human lives. Their impact can be immediate or long-term. Nonetheless, in both cases, atrocities cause people to suffer and, in many cases, force them to seek refuge in another country. In recent years, the world witnessed two major incidences in this regard. The Afghanistan-Taliban incident and the Russia-Ukraine war. Both events have forced many people to migrate to other countries. Many people fled their home country because they were afraid of war and conflict. They reported suffering not only during their journey but also in the places where they are living as refugees.

The current issue of Roots and Routes covers the issues related to the war and forced migration. The current issue presents two articles and a book review. The first article, titled "Germany's treatment of refugees regarding their right to asylum: A policy analysis," by Himani Chauhan, focuses on the issues that refugees face. The article argues that in Germany some countries have to go through a long and tough process to get refugee or asylum seeker status, whereas people from other countries get easy protection. The second article, titled "The Cost of Wars in Afghanistan: A Review of its Impacts on Immigration," by Mohiden Farahmand, focuses on the impact of conflicts on Afghanistan. The article argues that the four decades of conflicts hinder the social progress of the people. Moreover, the takeover by the Taliban has further worsened the condition, both in terms of human lives and financial aspects. The current issue also carries a book review titled "Diaspora Networks and International Migration of Skills: How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad." Angelo Gianturco Coletta has reviewed it.

We invite readers to participate and share their experiences with us to have a meaningful engagement. You can communicate with us through email at editorinchief@grfdt.com. We wish you happy reading and look forward to your suggestions and comments.

Happy Reading!

Feroz Khan

GERMANY'S TREATMENT OF REFUGEES REGARDING THEIR RIGHT TO ASYLUM – POLICY ANALYSIS

Introduction

Refugees flee their home countries in search of a safer place because they fear persecution. However, refugees often face more challenges and ill-treatment when they arrive in host countries, especially regarding their right to asylum. Germany has received more refugees from their neighbouring countries, especially in times of crisis and war. Historically, Germany received a proportionally high number of refugees due to the Yugoslav Wars and the Syrian Civil War, yet their approach to refugees continues to vary over the years and this has most recently been seen with the Ukraine Crisis.

The Plight of Yugoslavian Refugees

Throughout the 1990s, many Yugoslavians entered Germany to seek asylum due to the Yugoslavian Wars. Ethnic cleansing occurred throughout the Wars where the police, military and political authorities tried to completely reduce if not annihilate ethnic groups within a given territory (Radovic, 2005). These acts pushed civilians to leave their homes and seek asylum elsewhere. Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that “everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948). Based on this, Germany would be expected to grant asylum but since the UDHR is non-binding, a state’s duty to grant asylum remained ambiguous, resulting in Germany granting protection rather than asylum to refugees (Hageboutros, 2016; Oltmer, 2016).

During the initial years of the War, Germany had “taken tons and thousands of Slovenes and Croats” (Hageboutros, 2016, 52). As the Wars continued, Germany started to receive more refugees from Bosnia & Herzegovina with an average of 311,250 refugees per year between 1994 and 1997 (UNHCR, n.d.). As a result, Germany started changing their policies and laws regarding their borders. However, in closing their

borders, they faced a lot of international and domestic criticism, causing them to reopen their borders whilst also easing visa restrictions and protecting the sick and wounded became a priority (Hageboutros, 2016). In effect, Germany decided to grant Yugoslavians Temporary Protection Status rather than Refugee Status as they were unable to prove they were fleeing persecution.

Germany took two different approaches to Temporary Protection Status – *dudlung* and *aufenthaltsbefungis*. *Dudlung* translates to toleration, whereas *aufenthaltsbefungis* translates to temporary residence, so refugees were treated differently based on their status (Hageboutros, 2016). For instance, those with *dudlung* status “were prevented from working or attending school” and constantly feared deportation, whereas the government gave residence to those with *aufenthaltsbefungis* status whilst restricting their movement (Hageboutros, 2016, 56). The two distinct approaches reflect how refugees were not considered a priority in the labour market unless they had over four years of employment or one year of training (Barslund et al., 2017). This also shows that because Germany did not formally recognise them as refugees, they had very few integration measures in place. In effect, many Bosnians left Germany and settled elsewhere, reflecting how Germany never intended to let refugees permanently settle since Germany expected Yugoslavs to return home once the war ended (Barslund et al., 2017). However, Germany’s response to receiving Syrian refugees was different to how they approached Yugoslavian refugees almost twenty years prior.

Hope for Syrian Refugees

The mid-2010s saw an increase in refugees for Germany due to the Syrian Civil War. The later years of the Syrian Civil War caused many Syrians to leave their homes and seek refuge in Germany. The war began as early as 2011, but it was not until 2014 that the number

of civilians fleeing drastically increased. Life in Syria became unbearable for citizens as the war caused a lot of violence, collapsed infrastructure, and many distressed and endangered children (Reid, 2021). This reflects how civilians were pushed out of Syria due to multiple factors including the deteriorating economy and drastic reduction in civilians' standard of living environment. In 2020, Germany was among the top five countries to host Syrian refugees since the war began (Statista, 2021). This reflects how Syrians were pulled into Germany as they had greater chances of being granted refugee status since they were recognised as "victims of civil war" (Deutsche Welle, 2015).

The asylum-seeking procedure was easier for Syrians. The re-introduction of personal interviews in 2015 for all refugees meant they now needed to detail why they could not return to their country of origin (Deutsche Welle, 2015; UNHCR, n.d.). These interviews had both positives and negatives. On the one hand, it made it easier for Syrians to gain asylum since the media was reporting on the Syrian Civil War, whereas on the downside refugees were either granted refugee status or subsidiary protection (Deutsche Welle, 2019). Regardless, Germany was a destination country for Syrians because there were communities of common origin, making it easier for Syrians who were "fleeing war, civil conflict and the means of authoritative regimes" to feel at home (Oltmer, 2016, 30). This shows how Germany did not violate Syrian refugees' right to asylum.

Interestingly, Germany positively responded to Syrian refugees and other more recent crises because they feel guilty about their past actions and crimes such as the Holocaust (Momin, 2017). Although Germany failed to provide Syrian refugees with adequate measures and resources to help support them in this new country. In comparison, Germany has quickly responded to the current flow of Ukrainian refugees whilst taking a significantly different approach to how they treated Yugoslavian and Syrian refugees in the past.

Support for Ukrainian Refugees

Germany has had a quick and positive response to the current flow of Ukrainian Refugees compared to their past responses to refugees. The Ukraine War "destroyed

civilian infrastructure" causing civilians to flee their homes in search of a safer place (Jurić, 2022, 2). As a result, many Ukrainians arrived in Germany. Germany has had a positive response because, within the first week of the conflict, the Council of Europe decided that Temporary Protection should be granted to displaced persons from Ukraine (UNHCR, n.d.). The European Union has also "granted Ukrainians the automatic right to stay and work through its 27 member nations for up to three years" (BBC News, 2022). These decisions show how Ukrainians do not have to go through long and complicated asylum procedures that past refugees struggled with (Deutsche Welle, 2022). In Germany, Ukrainians can work "without claiming asylum" (Jurić, 2022, 6).

There is also an increased amount of support given to Ukrainian refugees. Ukrainians are now entitled to receive assistance through "Social Code II (SGB 11) – typically called Hartz IV" where a single person will receive "€449 a month, as well as statutory health insurance and immediate access to the labor market" (Deutsche Welle, 2022). The increased use of technology has also resulted in the creation of the website [Germany4Ukraine](#). The Federal Government created this website as a support portal for refugees from Ukraine where they can seek and find resources that help them. (Germany 4 Ukraine, 2022.). There is also a page dedicated to integration courses (Germany 4 Ukraine, 2022). Based on this, it may be assumed that Germany has had a change in attitude toward its response to refugees. However, the real reason for this change is because of the positive impact of Ukrainian refugees on German economy. Germany is facing a demographic crisis where there is a lack of people working in the labour force. In effect, "Germany needs to import about 400,000 employees every year to maintain its pension and health care system" (Deutsche Welle, 2022). In effect, Ukrainian refugees can work in the labour market, reflecting why Germany is taking such a welcoming approach toward Ukrainian Refugees.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be observed through historical trajectory of policies that Germany has often abused refugees' right to asylum. Yugoslavians were not

formally recognised as refugees and had to undergo a long asylum-seeking procedure only to be given a form of temporary protection. In comparison, Syrians went through shorter and easier procedures to be given refugee status. For Ukrainians, it can be said that temporary protection was simply given to them without having to go through long procedures. It is interesting to see how different the asylum-seeking procedures are for refugees even though Germany's refugee population is mostly a result of some sort of war or civil conflict. Since Germany's approach to refugees has historically changed as it receive more refugees, it should reflect on their past refugee policies. In effect, this allows Germany to create a new and more permanent refugee policy that is unlikely to change when civil conflicts cause them to receive more refugees. As Ukrainians have become refugees fairly recently, it will be interesting to see how Germany will respond to Ukrainian Refugees in the coming months and years.

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Himani Chauhan is an International Relations & History graduate and is currently pursuing a Masters of Migration Studies from Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand). She comes from a family of immigrants which has shaped her experiences, views, and interests in wanting to further explore and work in this area of study. Her area of interest includes – Migration, History and Human Rights.



The image shows the cover of the journal "Migration and Diasporas: An Interdisciplinary Journal". The cover has a teal background. At the top right is the logo for GRFDT (Global Research Forum for Diaspora and Transnationalism), which features a globe and the text "GRFDT Global Research Forum for Diaspora and Transnationalism". The title "MIGRATION AND DIASPORAS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL" is written in large, bold, yellow capital letters in the center. Below the title, it says "For more details, email to: Email: migrationanddiasporas@grfdt.com". At the bottom, there is a "Call for Paper" in large, bold, yellow italicized font. Below this, there are three overlapping images of the journal cover, each showing a world map with orange and yellow highlights. At the bottom right of the cover, the website "www.grfdt.com" is listed.

THE COST OF WARS IN AFGHANISTAN: A REVIEW OF ITS IMPACTS ON IMMIGRATION

Introduction

The tales of war in Afghanistan are filled with dark and bitter narrations, and peace has always been a distant dream for the people. This article aims to explore the four decades of conflict in Afghanistan and its impact on citizens' life, revealing the myriad consequences of perpetual war on human life. The return of the Taliban rule has brought about the reinforcement of ultraconservative notions which hinder societal progress. This review focuses on the Afghan migrant crisis in a historical context, the impact of war on migration, and other costs of the war. Individual narratives pertaining to life in war-torn regions in Afghanistan have been reflected in media such as the Internet and television. This paper, by focusing on data, reports, and research and by applying Meta-Data analyzing methods, aims to show the multiple dimensions of war and its consequences. The article is divided into three sections. Each section delineates the financial, humanitarian, and environmental costs of the war, respectively.

Financial costs

The four decades of conflict that persists till now began in 1978 following the communist revolution, which saw the establishment of a communist government buttressed by Soviet military aid. The decade that followed was defined by military coups and frequent clashes between the communist government and Mujahideen groups. This culminated in the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1992. Subsequently, a Mujahideen coalition government was formed, and it became embroiled in yet another civil war.

According to the CIA report, the Soviet Union spent an estimated 15 Billion Ruble (50 Billion Dollars) on the invasion of Afghanistan during 1979- 1986. (CIA,2000,2). Another statistical estimate suggests that 76-152 billion Dollars were involved in Soviet actions

(Ewans,2005,12). The total expense that entailed the Soviet invasion till the complete withdrawal of its troops is estimated as 80-100 Billion Dollars. The war expenses on the part of the Afghan government in the military sector were around 11.7 billion dollars.

On the opposing side, the USA spent 3 billion dollars from 1980-1989 as assistance to Mujahideen groups and other Jihadist outfits seeking to overthrow the Soviet-sponsored government. Pakistan received 5 billion from the US and its allies for cooperation with the Jihadist factions. (Goodson, 2001. 182-184). Another source of foreign aid was Saudi Arabia, which contributed 4 billion dollars to the jihadist cause. (Pear, New York Times,1988)

The establishment of the Islamic Republic in Kabul led by the Mujahideen coalition was met with staunch opposition from various quarters. Consequently, a civil war broke out, in which the Hamahangi council aiming to overturn the government, played a decisive role. This war entailed heavy economic loss on both sides. By extrapolating the cost involved in the Soviet invasion during this period, 10-14 billion dollars (3 billion internal+ 12 billion external) are estimated to accompany the Civil War.

The Taliban government provided a safe haven for many terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda. Aiming to stop the growing militant Islamism in the region, the US allies carried out airstrikes against the Taliban, thus marking the beginning of the American invasion of Afghanistan. This military offensive cost 2 trillion dollars to International Allies (Myers, Military times,2021). This amount included the aid provided for the Afghanistan Army and the NATO forces deployed. 110000 army soldiers were deployed in Afghanistan under the leadership of the United States of America. This war in Afghanistan was the most expensive campaign for the US since World War II. The Taliban's fiscal resource was primarily from opium cultivation

and external aid.

Poverty and unemployment were the immediate impacts of the war in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, since the Red Revolution, saw a steady income decline. Farmlands were widely destroyed. Prices of food and other essential commodities soared by 50%. In 2019, unemployment was at an unprecedented 74.5%. The poverty rate, as per current UNDP estimates, is projected to increase to a disastrous 97%.

Humanitarian costs of the Conflict

The communist rule led by Noor Mohammad Taraki, which ensued during the Red Revolution, was characterized by acts of violence across the country.

The government organized mass killings of political opponents and brutally repressed democratic uprisings and dissenting ideas. During the first two years of Taraki's rule, 12000 political opponents were executed by the government. One of the most brutal episodes of government violence was the Herat Uprising of 1979, locally known as the Uprising of 24th Hoot, which was a series of insurrections against the communist regime. The government reacted with aerial bombardment of the Herat province and the ruthless massacre of the protestors. The death toll is estimated to be between 3000 and 25000. Subsequently, in 1989, the USSR launched an invasion of Afghanistan which entailed the loss of an estimated 800,000 to 1 million lives. (Khalidi,1991,107). The Civil War between the ruling Mujahideen factions and the Taliban involved massive destruction of life and property.

During 1992-1993 approximately 30000 citizens were killed and 100000 citizens injured in Kabul. Statistical estimates indicate that, during 1978-2000, around 1.8 million citizens were killed, and 1.5 million were maimed, among which 30000 were children.

According to research by The International Red Cross Committee, before 1999, 1.7 million were killed and 2 million injured due to the war in Afghanistan. (ICRC, 199, 2). The death toll among the 115000 Russian soldiers stationed in Afghanistan was 14454.

The perpetual state of war in Afghanistan has marred the social atmosphere of the country, making it a

dangerous place to survive. The war in Afghanistan triggered a mass migration of Afghans across and out of the country. The four decades of internal conflict have produced 6 million refugees in Afghanistan, thereby making it the third country in the world worst affected by the refugee crisis. During 1978-1992, about 6 million citizens fled the country and sought refuge in Iran and Pakistan. Another 2 million were internally displaced. (Goodson, 2001, 92). After the establishment of the Islamic Republic following the complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops, about 1.2 million Afghan expatriates returned to their homeland. But, the civil war that soon ensued compelled the returnees to seek shelter elsewhere. Pakistan, by restricting its borders, sought to restrain the influx of Afghan refugees, while Iran continued to welcome them. During 1992-1997, the country suffered an internal displacement crisis affecting 1.5 million. The refugee crisis was exacerbated as the Taliban took over. Ethnic violence reached unprecedented levels under the aegis of the Taliban rule. As of 2000, Afghanistan had 5 million external and 2 million internally displaced citizens.

The constant atmosphere of war prevailing in Afghanistan is primarily responsible for the protracted migrant crisis. The persistent conflict had the direct involvement of 5 percent of the population.

To demonstrate the enormity of the conflict, the Jihadist army comprised 321,000 men, while the opposing factions had a manpower of 274,000. Even after 1992, 321,000 Jihadist troops were involved in fighting the communist forces. Thus, about 0.7 million of the 16.5 million population of Afghanistan were involved in the war.

Environmental costs

According to a SIGAR report, since 1995, the cultivation of opium has increased from 56,828 hectares of farmland to 300,000 hectares in 2018, contributing to the surge in the production of the drug on a global scale from 75% to 84%. The drug was priced at 100,000 dollars in the global market. But opium cultivators in Helmand province were paid only 50-80 dollars, which was just 10% of the whole price.

Drug cultivation thrived in an atmosphere mired in instability and despondency, rendering around 4

million addicted to drugs and prone to early mortality. (Farahmand, 1399, 158)

As many as 14000 villages were ravaged in constant wars till 2000. Afghanistan is predominantly rural, and its villages are the basis of collective life where humans, plants, and animals share a sustainable relationship. The destruction of villages shows the extremities of the disaster in Afghanistan. As per estimates of the CIA report, the Russian invasion brought forth environmental damage equivalent to 6.7 billion dollars. (CIA, 1987, 7)

Furthermore, during the four decades of conflict, Afghanistan became a testing ground for weapons of mass destruction. During the Soviet invasion, it was apprehended that Russia would launch nuclear weapons on Afghan soil. But nuclear weapons were deployed for the first time during the early stages of the American invasion, in the Battle of Tora Bora. Nuclear fallout following the Tora Bora engagement, if calculated, would be 100-400% more than that of the Gulf War Battlefield. Secondly, cluster bombs with immense destructive potential have been widely used by the American military against Afghan civilians during the period. (McDonald, 2007, 55)

Conclusion

The ramifications of the four decades of war in Afghanistan are unfathomable. Prior to the American invasion in 2001, Afghanistan had a very low prevalence of civilian deaths, emigration, and drug dependence. Since 2001, 60-70% of the population has been on the verge of these above humanitarian issues. Quoting data from the article, 20.3 million of its citizens have been directly affected by these issues, among which 6 million emigrated, 3 million were internally displaced, 2.3 million killed, 3 million injured, 2 million were disabled, and 4 million under severe drug dependence. Now, with the re-establishment of the Taliban rule, prospects of a better life in Afghanistan are extinguished, as the Taliban doggedly refuses to change its regressive notions centered on religious extremism and partisanship.

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DIASPORA NETWORKS AND INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF SKILLS: *How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad*

Yevgeny Kuznetsov (2006). *Diaspora Networks and International Migration of Skills: How Countries Can Draw on Their Talent Abroad*. Washington DC: The World Bank. ISBN-13: 978-0-8213-6648-3, 250 pages.

Despite the COVID-19 Pandemic, international migration reached 281 million people in 2020, equal to 3.6% of the world's population (The Economic Times, 2021). The resulting diaspora population could serve as a pivotal change for their origin countries' development. Diaspora networks count on the necessary knowledge and capital to advance policy reform, the importance lay in how to design these networks and how to efficiently connect them with the government.

While published more than a decade ago, *Diaspora Networks and International Migration of Skills* center precisely on analyzing how and when highly skilled diasporas intertwined with the development of their home countries. Divided into 4 Parts: Analytical Framework and Major Policy Issues; Expatriate Talent and home country development: Lessons of mature diaspora networks; emerging Diaspora Networks; and Implications of policy and institutional development, Yevgeny Kuznetsov comprises the views of international development actors regarding the benefits that can be retrieved from diasporas networks.

The first chapter of the book serves as an introduction, where the key concepts are treated, providing a clear path of the book content. Chapter 2 is written by David Ellerman, a philosopher who works in the economic, political economy, and social theory fields, and

discusses the benefits and disadvantages of migration through literature. In the third chapter, Richard Devane argues how the “know-how” and financial recourses of diasporas could benefit their origin country, highlighting how a powerful member of the ex-pat community can

aid to increase the investment in its home country.

The second part of the book offers specific examples of diaspora networks. Chapter 5 treats the evolution of low-skilled Mexican migrants and how they organize to protect migrants' rights in the United States of America. Chapter 6 revolves around the Armenian case and why diaspora investments are so scarce.

The third part, analyzes small high-skill diaspora networks and the difficulties of their engagement with their countries of origin, as is the case of Argentina (Chapter 7), South Africa (Chapter 8), and Colombia (Chapter 9).

Finally, the fourth part discusses the policy reform associated with well-established diaspora networks. Chapter 10, written by Mairi MacRae, describes a successful example of a diaspora network, the Globalscot Scottish one. And the last chapter is dedicated to offering a blueprint for fruitful diaspora and home country integration.

Kuznetsov serves as Senior Economist at the World Bank since 1995, Senior Advisor to the Skolkovo Innovation Foundation, and a Senior Research Fellow at the Migration Policy Institute. His work and studies focus on innovation and higher education system reforms. He is also specializing in highly skilled migrants, studying




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how highly skilled diasporas can be used to advance the development of their home countries.

Although the phenomenon of “brain drain” is usually perceived as negative for the country of origin, this book centers on the possibilities that can be retrieved from it, where diaspora networks can apply the learned new skills to their countries, mostly by contributing to public policy debates and reform plans. The author specifies that these networks “do not need to be investors or make financial contributions to have an impact” (pp.3), they can rather act as bridges for new investments and added expertise. Examples such as the Indian diaspora proves Kuznetsov’s view, where they have served to increase capital accumulation by reinforcing the link between foreign and domestic investment, resulting in new domestic job opportunities as well. Another positive example is the Globalscot network, a global business network for Scottish nationals that aims to contribute to the country’s success. In this specific case, the network is financed by the country developing agency, proving that countries of origin can, and should, seek direct relations with conational diaspora networks.

The book illustrates negative examples as well, as is the case of Armenia, where the country elites are reluctant to engage with diaspora groups fearing they could lose some of their financial benefits. Other unsuccessful stories are shared, such as the Argentinian and Colombian ones, where diasporas have encountered obstacles in engaging with their governments.

The book concludes with possible recommendations to engage diasporas and agencies depending on the local setting’s needs and conditions. Kuznetsov states that in the case of a well-established diaspora network but with poor home country conditions, engagement should be focused on demonstration projects. While in the case of a poor diaspora network, but with favorable country conditions, the diaspora role should be emphasized in knowledge growth. And finally, with a good diaspora network and favorable home country conditions, the engagement should revolve around the transition from an economy based on knowledge.

The author resume the importance of further studies on the engagement of diaspora networks stating:

“Although successful cases of diaspora engagement are relatively rare when they do occur, it is not usually due to deliberate intervention. In most cases, diasporas and expatriate networks emerge spontaneously. Serendipity seems to be much more important than government interventions.” (pp.224)

Dedicated “for practitioners by practitioners” (pp. viii), *Diaspora Networks and International Migration of Skills* provide an analysis of how Diasporas can advance their countries’ economic growth on a transfer of knowledge level, distancing from the traditional financial contributions as remittances. The book serves to pave the way for deeper studies of diaspora engagement in policy reform with their home countries. Whereas the book focused only on high skill migration, which is still a small percentage of global migration, it provides hope for irregular migration as well, since as in the case of India, an integrated diaspora results in economic growth and jobs creation in the country of origin, providing additional opportunities that could potentially translate into a durable solution to irregular migration. Since its content focus on a rather specific migration topic, it would particularly serve development professionals. However, the book could offer a broader perspective for social science academics and migration professionals in general, to deepen their understanding of the role diasporas can play in their countries of origin.

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